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NOTES
North Carolina's South African Divestment Statute
On March 17, 1987, the state of North Carolina had a 13.9 million dollar
investment in the Raytheon Company.1 If the state still maintained that invest-
ment on July 1, 1987, the State Treasurer would have been legally obligated to
withdraw a minimum of 4.6 million dollars of the Raytheon investment from the
state's investment portfolio.2 The reason: North Carolina's Act to Prohibit the
Investment of Retirement and University Trust Funds in Certain Companies
Involved with South Africa which became effective July 1, 1987.3 As a result of
1. MINUTES OF HOUSE COMM. ON COURTS AND ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, 1987 Gen. Assembly,
1st Sess. 2-3 (March 17, 1987) [hereinafter MINUTES] (statement of Mr. C. Douglas Chappell, Direc-
tor, Investment and Banking Division, Department of State Treasurer).
2. See infra notes 28-31 and accompanying text.
3. Act of June 22, 1987, ch. 446, 1987 N.C. Sess. Laws 588 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 147-69.2(c) (1987)). North Carolina's Divestment Act is based on the Sullivan Principles. The
Principles were developed in 1978 by the Reverend Leon H. Sullivan, a Philadelphia minister, who
also served on the Board of Directors of General Motors Corporation. INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL
FOR EQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITY PRINCIPLES, INC., NINTH REPORT ON THE SIGNATORY COMPA-
NIES To THE SULLIVAN PRINCIPLES 1 (1985) [hereinafter NINTH REPORT]. Reverend Sullivan has
since repudiated the Principles. Barnaby, Sullivan Asks End of Business Links With South Africa,
N.Y. Times, June 4, 1987, § A, at 1, col. 1. The Principles amount to a set of employment standards
outlining equality in pay, employment opportunity, and access. Specifically, the principles are:
(1) Nonsegregation of the races in all eating, comfort, locker room and work facilities; (2)
Equal and fair employment practices for all employees; (3) Equal pay for all employees
doing equal or comparable work for the same period of time; (4) Initiation and develop-
ment of training programs that will prepare blacks, coloureds, and asians in substantial
numbers for supervisory, administrative, clerical, and technical jobs; (5) Increasing the
number of blacks, coloureds, and asians in management and supervisory positions; (6) Im-
proving the quality of employees' lives outside the work environment in such areas as
housing, transportation, schooling, recreation, and health facilities; (7) Working to elimi-
nate laws and customs that impede social and political justice.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 147-69.2(c)(I)-(7) (1987).
To become a signatory to the Principles, companies must express written commitment to them,
prepare and submit an annual report or self-evaluation of progress on compliance with the princi-
ples, and pay a fee based on their aggregate worldwide sales. As of October 25, 1985, 186 United
States companies were signatories to the Sullivan Principles. Eight of these companies had sub-
scribed too late to be included in the Ninth Report. NINTH REPORT, supra, at 22-23. In 1986 the
annual fee ranged between $1200 and $8400. NINTH REPORT, supra, at 1. The annual report pub-
lished by the International Council for Equality is developed from the signatory companies' individ-
ual reports. These reports, in turn, are based on "self-reported responses by signatories to a rather
lengthy questionnaire prepared and distributed by Arthur D. Little, Inc." Paul, The Inadequacy of
Sullivan Reporting, 57 Bus. & Soc. REV. 61, 62 (1986); see also LEGISLATIVE RES. COMM'N, STATE
INVESTMENTS WITH SOUTH AFRICAN INVESTORS, REPORT TO THE 1987 GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF
NORTH CAROLINA 6, 7 (1986) [hereinafter LRC REPORT] (describing reporting procedures); NINTH
REPORT, supra, at 1-3 (same).
Based on the questionnaires, signatories receive one of three ratings. To receive the highest
rank-Category I-a company must complete a full-length survey and be "making good progress"
on all Principles. A company receives a Category IIA rank if it is "making progress" on fulfilling
the Principles and completes a full length survey. A Category IIB rank indicates the company
completed the short form. A company receives a Category IIIA rank if it has fulfilled Principles 1-3,
but has not made satisfactory progress on Principles 4-7, on which it "needs to become more active."
A company receives a Category IIIB rank if it has failed. to comply with Principles 1-3. NINTH
REPORT, supra, at 10.
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the Divestment Act North Carolina joined at that time approximately twenty
other states4 that had taken some form of action expressing disagreement with
South Africa's policy of apartheid,5 and also placed itself in the midst of a na-
tional legal debate on the constitutionality of state and local divestment actions.
6
This Note reviews the history and possible effects of North Carolina's Di-
vestment Act and compares North Carolina's legislation with steps other states
have taken. The Note then analyzes the constitutionality of the Act under sev-
eral principles: the interstate commerce clause,7 the foreign commerce clause,8
federal preemption, 9 and federal control over matters of foreign policy.10 The
4. LRC REPORT, supra note 3, at 5 app. C. As of February 1987 32 states, 76 cities, and 16
counties had enacted some form of divestment legislation. Brief for Appellants at 16 n.7, Lubman v.
Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, No. 87-104 (Md. filed Oct. 9, 1987).
5. Apartheid is the South African government's policy of "separate development" by which
the government denies blacks the rights enjoyed by whites in nearly every facet of life. The policy
deprives blacks of equal treatment in governmental representation, voting, housing, work, and edu-
cation, and denies them freedoms of speech, assembly, and mobility. See LRC REPORT, supra note
3, at 1-3; Gosiger, Strategies for Divestment from United States Companies and Financial Institutions
Doing Business With or In South Africa, 8 HuM. RTs. Q. 517, 517-18 (1986).
6. It has been noted that divestment is to be differentiated from disinvestment, which more
often refers to a company's withdrawal from South Africa. Note, State and LocalAnti-South Africa
Action As An Intrusion Upon the Federal Power in Foreign Affairs, 72 VA. L. REv. 813, 816 n.21
(1986) [hereinafter VIRGINIA Note]. The following commentaries argue the unconstitutionality of
divestment statutes. Retirement System: Investment Policies, 87 Tenn. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 84 (May
5, 1987); DIsiNvEsTMEr: Is IT LEGAL? IS IT MORAL? Is IT PRODUCTIVE? (Nat'l Legal Center for
the Pub. Interest 1985) [hereinafter Nat'l Legal Center]; Note, Challenges to the Constitutionality of
the California Divestment Statute, 19 PAC. L.J. 217 (1987) [hereinafter PACIFIC Note]; VIRGINIA
Note, supra, at 813. The following works generally support the constitutionality of divestment stat-
utes. 87 Kan. Op. Att'y Gen. No 62 (Apr. 3, 1987); Lewis, Dealing With South Africa: The Consti-
tutionality of State and Local Divestment Legislation, 61 TUL. L. REV. 469 (1987); Note. Socially
Responsible Investment ofPublic Pension Funds: The South Africa Issue and State Law, 10 N.Y.U.
REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 407 (1981) [hereinafter N.Y.U. Note]; Note, State and Municipal Govern-
ments React Against South African Apartheid: An Assessment of the Constitutionality of the Divest-
ment Campaign, 54 U. CIN. L. REv. 543 (1985) [hereinafter CINCINNATI Note]; The Con-
stitutionality of State and Local Divestiture Legislation (Lawyers' Comm. for Civil Rights Under
Law, Aug. 1984 memorandum) [hereinafter Lawyers' Comm.].
In light of the lack of any conclusive legal opinion on the constitutionality of divestment acts,
one commentator has advocated that states not adopt disinvestment legislation until a definitive
ruling emerges. Blaustein, Disinvestment-The Constitutional Question, in Nat'l Legal Center,
supra, at 76-80. Since that comment was made, there have been several legal challenges to divest-
ment statutes. Only one of these involved a federal constitutional challenge. See Board of Trustees
v. Mayor of Baltimore, No. 86365065/CE-59858, slip op. (Cir. Ct. Balt. July 17, 1987) (upholding
Baltimore divestment ordinances). The Baltimore ordinance called for total divestment of monies
and other funds in the city's Retirement System invested in companies or financial institutions doing
business in or with the Republic of South Africa or Namibia or subsidiaries of those companies.
Divestment was required within two years of enactment. The ordinance contained an escape clause
during which divestment could be halted if the Board of Trustees for the Retirement System could
demonstrate that it would not be able to divest without incurring unacceptable financial losses. BAL-
TIMORE, MD. ORDINANCES 765, 792 (July 3, 1986). Both parties filed appellate briefs in fall 1987
following the grant of certoriari 530 Md. 567, 530 A.2d (1987). No decision had been rendered as of
mid-April 1989. The other two court challenges were decided on nonconstitutional grounds. See
infra note 10 for discussion of these cases.
7. See infra notes 82-117 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 118-44 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 43-81 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 145-225 and accompanying text. Divestment statutes raise other issues re-
lated to a trustee's fiduciary duty in making investments, interference with contract, and equal pro-
tection. These will not be addressed in this Note. See generally 85 Haw. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 26
(Nov. 25, 1985) (discussing investment standards); 87 Kan. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 62 (Apr. 3, 1987)
(discussing trustee's standard of care in investing); Retirement System: Investment Policy, 87 Tenn.
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Note concludes that North Carolina's Divestment Act clearly would survive a
challenge based on preemption and arguably would survive the interstate com-
merce clause challenge. To survive a challenge based on the foreign commerce
clause, however, the general assembly would need to amend the Act to limit its
scope. The Note acknowledges that the greatest constitutional challenge to the
Divestment Act lies in Congress' power to dictate foreign affairs, but argues that
the case law in this area is not sufficiently analogous or developed to constitute
an adequate basis on which to evaluate the North Carolina General Assembly's
decision regarding how to manage its fiscal responsibilities. In light of the short-
comings of foreign affairs case law, and in response to a leading foreign affairs
commentator's suggestion that a new balancing test may need to be developed to
address the constitutionality of state actions having foreign affairs implications,
this Note presents a model balancing test and applies it to the North Carolina
Act.
The 1985 North Carolina General Assembly authorized the Legislative Re-
search Commission" to conduct a feasibility study on withdrawing certain re-
tirement system funds and University of North Carolina system trust fund
investments from companies either doing business in or with South Africa, or
holding outstanding loans extended to the Republic of South Africa.12 The gen-
eral assembly authorized the study in response to two proposed pieces of legisla-
tion. These proposals encouraged North Carolina corporations to end all forms
of financial involvement with South Africa 13 and required the state to withdraw
from its retirement and University trust fund portfolios investments held in
companies and financial institutions with loans and business dealings in South
Africa.14
During 1986 the Divestment Study Subcommittee considered three distinct
divestment options: full or absolute divestment, i5 divestment from companies
Op. Att'y Gen. No. 84 (May 5, 1987) (discussing interference with contract and equal protection
issues); N.Y.U. Note, supra note 6 (discussing pension investment standards); see also Regents of the
Univ. of Michigan v. State of Michigan, 166 Mich. App. 314, 419 N.W.2d 773 (1988) (holding that
state statute prohibiting state educational institutions from making or maintaining an investment "in
organizations operating in South Africa" unconstitutional as applied because state constitution
granted Regents plenary authority to allocate University funds); Associated Students of the Univ. of
Oregon v. Oregon Inv. Council, 82 Or. App. 145, 728 P.2d 30 (1986) (complaint dismissed for lack
of standing by plaintiffs). Nor will this Note discuss with any specificity the constitutionality of
complementary statutes the general assembly passed that enabled cities, counties, and local school
boards to take a company's involvement in South Africa into account in developing public contract
bid requirements. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 153A-141, 160A-197, 115C-49 (1987) (referring respectively
to the county, city, and local school board enabling laws); see MINUTES OF HOUSE STATE GOVERN-
MENT COMMITTEE (July 22, 1987) (legislative history maintained in the General Assembly library);
MINUTES OF SENATE JUDICIARY I COMMITTEE (May 21, 1987).
11. The Legislative Research Commission exists to study and investigate public policy issues
for the general assembly and to report and recommend action to that body. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 120-
30.17(1) (1986).
12. Act of July 18, 1985, ch. 790, § 2.1, 1985 N.C. Sess. Laws 1314, 1320.
13. The proposed, but unenacted, legislation was House Resolution 527, 1985 General Assem-
bly. See LRC REPORT, supra note 3, at B-1 to -4.
14. The proposed, but unenacted, legislation was House Bill 744, 1985 General Assembly. See
LRC REPORT, supra note 3, at B-5 to -6.
15. Full divestment requires withdrawing all funds from companies conducting business in or
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that were nonsignatories of the Sullivan Principles, 16 and divestment from com-
panies that were either not Sullivan Principles subscribers or were subscribers
but had not received one of the highest two rankings companies can earn based
on the Sullivan criteria. 17 The committee selected the last option as the least
extreme and least expensive to the state's investment program.18 Specifically the
committee's proposed bill required divesting from companies, incorporated
within or without the United States, and financial institutions holding outstand-
ing loans in South Africa when these companies were not Sullivan Principles
signatories or were signatories but had not received a Category I or II rating. 19
Each general assembly committee that considered the bill after reviewing the
opinions of actuaries on the bill's potential effects on the retirement and trust
funds reported it favorably.20
The general assembly ratified the bill on June 22, 1987, after adopting three
significant changes at the committee's suggestion.2 1 The first change provided
that funds held in financial institutions with outstanding loans in South Africa
would not be divested if the lending institutions maintained contact with South
Africa solely to collect their loans.22 The second change clarified the sources of
information the State Treasurer was authorized to use in deciding which compa-
nies were doing business in or with South Africa and which had received
favorable Sullivan Principles compliance ratings.23 Finally, the enacted bill in-
cluded a newly-adopted Principle requiring companies to work to "eliminate
laws and customs [in South Africa] that impede social and political justice."
'24
The Divestment Act performs two functions: (1) it prohibitsfuture invest-
ments in companies incorporated either in the United States or in a foreign
country which do business in or with South Africa and do not subscribe to the
Sullivan Principles or do subscribe but receive a "failing" grade; and (2) it re-
quires divestment of all current investments held in companies similarly incorpo-
rated that do not meet either of these criteria. The Act does not affect
investments in companies that are first-year signatories to the Sullivan Princi-
with South Africa without regard to the companies' employment practices in that country. See
Gosiger, supra note 5, at 535-37.
16. See supra note 3 for discussion on signatories.
17. See supra note 3 for discussion on rankings.
18. LRC REPORT, supra note 3, at 29. See generally id. at 10-15, 25-27, E-6 to -8 for a descrip-
tion of how each option the committee considered would have affected the funds at the end of tile
first and last fiscal quarter of 1986.
19. See supra note 3 for a discussion of rankings. The committee's final version was modeled
after Connecticut's 1980 divestment statute, the first state divestment law. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 3-13f (West Supp. 1981) (effective May 27, 1980); see also N.Y.U. Note, supra note 6, at 413
(discussing Connecticut's statute).
20. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 120-114 (1988) (describing the actuarial note requirements); infra
notes 33-36 and accompanying text discussing these findings.
21. See MINtrrEs, supra note 1, at 2.
22. See MINUTES, supra note 1, at 2.
23. N.C. GEN STAT. § 169.2(c) (1987); see MINUTES, supra note 1, at 2; proposed bill, re-
printed in LRC REPORT, supra note 3, at 17-21.
24. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 169.2(c)(2)(7) (1987); see NINTH REPORT, supra note 3, at 3 (discussing
adoption of new principle).
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ples. 25 Moreover, the bill affects only certain funds maintained by the State
Treasurer, namely state pension funds26 and trust funds of the University of
North Carolina system and its constituent institutions.27
The Divestment Act does not require immediate withdrawal of funds from
companies that fail to meet the investment criteria. The State Treasurer is au-
thorized to extend the divestment process over a three-year period should
"sound investment policy so require[]. ' '28 When the treasurer decides this
clause applies, however, a minimum of one-third of the investment must be
withdrawn during each of the first two years.29 The Act does not affect the two
lending institutions in which the State has investments as long as those institu-
tions are maintaining contact only to collect outstanding debts. 30 This comports
with the federal ban placed on the ability of United States companies to "make
or approve any loan or ... extension of credit.., to the Government of South
Africa or to any corporation ... owned or controlled by the Government of
South Africa" after the enactment of the federal law.
31
It is difficult to predict with any accuracy the long-term financial effect of
North Carolina's Divestment Act. The actuarial notes and Legislative Study
Commission findings emphasized the speculative nature of the bill's effects.
32
The Study Commission concluded that the effect would be negligible because of
the "rapid withdrawal of companies from South Africa and the fact that more
companies are signing the Sullivan Principles and achieving acceptable perform-
ance ratings."' 33 The general assembly's consulting actuary also concluded that
the bill's effect would be negligible because as of November 26, 1986, all compa-
nies in which the state held investments could have met the Act's require-
ments.34 The State Treasurer and the Retirement Systems Plan Administrator
actuary concluded, however, that the Act would have the effect of increasing the
employers' costs of subsidizing retirement plans because of the restrictions under
25. These companies cannot be evaluated until the end of one year. NINTH REPORT, supra
note 3, at 5.
26. The bill erroneously refers to N.C. GEN STAT. § 147-69.2(b)(6) for the listing of affected
retirement system funds. The correct cross reference, is N.C. GEN. STAT. § 147-69.2(b)(8) which
lists the Teachers' and State Employees' Retirement System, the Consolidated Judicial Retirement
System, the Firemen's and Rescue Workers' Pension Fund, the Local Government Employees' Re-
tirement System, and the Legislative Retirement System.
27. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 116-36.1 (1987) (defining trust funds). Trust funds include fee
generated monies, but do not include University endowment funds over which each individual insti-
tution maintains investment autonomy. Id.
28. Act of June 22, 1987, ch. 446, § 2, 1987 N.C. Sess. Laws 588, 591.
29. Id.
30. Act of June 22, 1987, ch. 446, § 3, 1987 N.C. Sess. Laws 588, 591. In 1985 two lending
institutions, National Bank of North Carolina (NCNB) and BankAmerica Corporation, were af-
fected by this provision. Memorandum from C. Douglas Chappell to Harlan E. Boyles 2 (Mar. 10,
1986), reprinted in LRC REPORT, supra note 3, at E-7; Memorandum from C. Douglas Chappell to
Tom Covington (Sept. 26, 1985), reprinted in LRC REPORT, supra note 3, at E-5.
31. Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act, Pub. L. No. 99-440, § 305, 100 Stat. 1086 (codified at
22 U.S.C.A. § 5055 (West Supp. 1988)).
32. LRC REPORT, supra note 3, at 25-26; Letter from Charles R. Dilts to Sam Byrd, Fiscal
Research Division, North Carolina General Assembly (May 4, 1987) [hereinafter Dilts Letter]; ac-
cord N.Y.U. Note, supra note 6, at 418-19 (discussing uncertain effects of divestment actions).
33. LRC REPORT, supra note 3, at 27.
34. Dilts Letter, supra note 32.
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which the State Treasurer would have to operate. 3
5
The Legislative Research Commission report identified its proposed legisla-
tion as a compromise among alternative means of divestment. 36 Another option
would have been to pass a resolution urging divestment, but not mandating it
under any circumstance. 37 A third option would have been to require full or
absolute divestment. Massachusetts and California have both adopted this form
of action.
38
These various options have practical advantages and disadvantages. A full
divestment plan is easier to implement than North Carolina's plan for the sole
reason that it uses a "bright line test" of "doing business in South Africa" as the
standard for divesting.39 The review required under North Carolina's plan is
more extensive because it involves discerning not merely whether a company
does business in South Africa, but whether the company's conduct in South
Africa meets acceptable Sullivan Principles standards. The resolution of the dis-
satisfaction option lacks an action-inducing quality and, as a result, may not
provide as forceful a statement as a state might desire.
A divestment statute based on the Sullivan Principles has serious practical
infirmities. First, critics argue that the Sullivan Principles approach fails to take
into account legitimate reasons a company could have for not subscribing to the
Sullivan Principles. Some companies may employ so few employees in South
Africa that the financial and administrative burdens of subscribing to the Princi-
ples outweigh the company's interests in subscribing.40 Second, legislation
based on the Sullivan Principles relies on a rating system that depends com-
pletely on companies' self-reporting. The absence of any independent verifica-
tion system calls the objectivity of the rating results into question. 41
Despite these drawbacks the Sullivan Principles provide the safest divest-
ment option. Divestment statutes in general raise a number of constitutional
issues, several of which are "close calls." A state that wishes to voice its opinion
on apartheid, therefore, must adopt a cautious position to minimize these consti-
tutional threats. Various constitutional challenges to the Act will be addressed,
beginning with the preemption challenge. The analysis concludes that North
Carolina's Act has a good chance of surviving these constitutional attacks pre-
cisely because it is based on the Sullivan Principles.42
35. Letter from Donald M. Overholser, Consulting Actuary, to E.T. Barnes (Apr. 7, 1987);
Memorandum from C. Douglas Chappell to Harlan E. Boyles, State Treasurer 2 (May 24, 1985),
reprinted in LRC REPORT, supra note 3, at E-3.
36. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
37. See LRC REPORT, supra note 3, at C-10 (noting Alaska's pending Resolution of 1986).
38. See LRC REPORT, supra note 3, at C-13; PACIFIC Note, supra note 6 (discussing California
divestment bill).
39. VIRGINIA Note, supra note 6, at 820.
40. Slater, Companies That Hide Behind the Sullivan Principles, 49 INTL. Bus. & Soc. REV. 15,
16 (1984).
41. Paul, The Inadequacy of Sullivan Reporting, 57 INTL. Bus. & Soc. REv. 61, 62 (1986); see
also Gosiger, supra note 5, at 528-35 (criticizing Sullivan Principles compliance program).
42. Schotland, Divergent Investing Of Pension Funds And University Endowments: Key Points
About The Pragmatics, And Two Current Case Studies, in Nat'l Legal Center, supra note 6, at 31, 66-
67.
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The United States Supreme Court has stated that in deciding if federal law
preempts state law, its "sole task is to ascertain the intent of Congress" and that
"preemption is not to be lightly presumed."'4 3 The Court determines congres-
sional intent in several ways. First, it looks to see if Congress included an ex-
press preemption statement in its legislation.44 The Court also infers
preemption when, by the language and structure it uses, Congress demonstrates
an implicit intent to "occup[y] the field" so that states have no room to oper-
ate.45 Finally, the Court finds preemption when there is an actual conflict be-
tween state and federal action.4 6 This can arise when "compliance with both
federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility" 47 or the state law stands
"as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and
objectives of Congress."
'4 8
A preemption challenge to the North Carolina Act would be based on Con-
gress' 1986 enactment of the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act (CAAA).
49
The stated purpose of the CAAA "is to set forth a comprehensive and complete
framework to guide the efforts of the United States in helping to bring an end to
apartheid in South Africa." 50 The legislative history contains the following de-
scription of the Act's purpose: "to promote political, economic and social
change leading to the dismantling of apartheid and the establishment of a nonra-
cial, democratic political system in the Republic of South Africa."
'51
To "undermine apartheid" 52 the congressional Act bans both private and
public actors from engaging in a number of activities including extending new
loans to the South African government;53 making new investments in South Af-
rica unless it involves a black South African-owned firm;54 importing kruger-
rands, 55 military articles, 56 and products from parastatal organizations;
57
43. California Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 107 S. Ct. 683, 689 (1987); 132 CONG. REC.
S12,535 (daily ed. Sept. 15, 1986) (Professor Tribe memorandum stating "a strong presumption
against finding federal preemption by mere implication").
44. Guerra, 107 S. Ct. at 683; Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977).
45. Guerra, 107 S. Ct. at 689; see also Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)
("Congress here legislated in a field which the States have traditionally occupied.").
46. Guerra, 107 S. Ct. at 689; Rice, 331 U.S. at 230; Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67
(1941).
47. Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963).
48. Hines, 312 U.S. at 67.
49. Pub. L. No. 99-440, 100 Stat. 1086 (codified at 22 U.S.C.A. §§ 5001-5116 (West Supp.
1988)).
50. 22 U.S.C.A. § 5002 (West Supp. 1988).
51. S. REP. No. 370, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEws 2335. But see id. at 2355 (the legislative history of the Act contains a commentary of North
Carolina Senator Jesse Helms who stated that the purpose of the CAAA was "to force the South
African Government to legitimize and negotiate a transfer of power to the Communist and terrorist
movements which espouse these methods." S. REP. No. 370, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 24, reprinted in
1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2334, 2355 ("Additional Views of Senator Jesse Helms")).
52. 22 U.S.C.A. § 5051 (West Supp. 1988).
53. Id. § 5055.
54. Id. § 5060.
55. Id. § 5051.
56. Id. § 5052.
57. Id. § 5053. A parastatal organization is defined as a "corporation or partnership owned or
1989]
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banning computer exports to South Africa 58 halting air transportation with
South Africa 59 and prohibiting nuclear trade.60 In addition, the CAAA
prescribes "Employment Practices of United States Nationals in South Af-
rica." 6 1 These practices codify the Sullivan Principles.62 The CAAA states that
"(a)ny national of the United States that employs more than 25 persons in South
Africa shall take the necessary steps to insure that the Code of Conduct is imple-
mented with respect to the employment of these persons."' 63 United States com-
panies "not implementing the Code of Conduct with respect to the employment
of these companies" may not receive assistance from any "department or agency
of the Unites States ... regarding [their] export market activities in any coun-
try."64 Moreover, while the CAAA enforcement section specifically disallows
imposition of a penalty on a United States company "for failure to implement
the Code of Conduct,"' 65 under certain conditions it would be possible for a
company to be subjected to civil penalties. Specifically, if the President of the
United States were to require companies to report on their progress in comply-
ing with the Code of Conduct,66 and a company were either to refuse to comply
with such an order or were to supply false information, the Secretary of State
would be obligated to "impose on [the company] a civil penalty of not more than
$10,000. '"67
The CAAA also contains a "sense of the Congress" statement which elabo-
rates on principles for United States companies to follow outside the workplace.
One of these principles involves "supporting the rescission of all apartheid
laws."
68
Congress did not include express preemption language in the CAAA. Re-
ferring to the CAAA text, Representative Solarz pointedly demonstrated that
there was not "a single paragraph, a single sentence or a single word in the
Senate bill which explicitly preempts the right of State and local governments to
controlled or subsidized by the Government of South Africa," excluding those begun with assistance
of the South African Industrial Development Corporation. Id. § 5053(b).
58. Id. § 5054.
59. Id. § 5056.
60. Id. § 5057.
61. Id. § 5034. Section 5001(5) defines the term "nationals" as:
(A) a natural person who is a citizen of the United States or who owes permanent
allegiance to the United States or is an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence in
the United States...; or
(B) a corporation, partnership, or other business association which is organized under
the laws of the United States, any State or territory thereof, or the District of Columbia
Id. § 5001(5).
62. See id. § 5035; S. REP. No. 370, 99th Cong. 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS 2336.
63. See 22 U.S.C.A. § 5034(a) (West Supp. 1988) (emphasis added).
64. Id. § 5034(b).
65. Id. § 5113(d)(3).
66. This measure is authorized under 22 U.S.C.A. § 5113(a)(2)(A).
67. Id. § 5113(d)(1).
68. Id. § 5035(b)(4).
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take action on South Africa."
69
Furthermore, evidence exists to show that Congress did not intend to oc-
cupy the field by its legislation and thereby did not deprive states and municipal-
ities of the ability to act on divestment. One factor courts consider in deciding
whether preemption implicitly exists is the congressional debate on the legisla-
tion. Representative Wolpe's statement offers initial instruction in this regard.
Commenting on an earlier apartheid bill which was substantially similar to the
CAAA, he noted that "there was not a single suggestion made in the entire
course of that debate by Members of either side . .. that the legislation has
anything to do whatsoever with an effort at preempting or superseding State and
local laws."
'70
The 1986 Senate debates on the CAAA included some narrowly focused
debate on preemption. The Senate was aware that a number of states and local
municipalities had adopted statutes requiring companies that had submitted pro-
curement contract bids to demonstrate as a criterion for bid offers that they
conducted no business in or with South Africa. Concerned that the CAAA
would cause these governments to lose federal subsidies they might have on
those contracts, Senator D'Amato introduced an amendment to protect against
such losses.7 1 The Senator characterized his amendment as "not address[ing]
the question of those State legislatures who have begun to undertake a policy of
disinvestment in terms of their pension funds with those companies who do busi-
ness or are located in South Africa."' 72 Senator Lugar vigorously opposed the
D'Amato amendment which was eventually defeated.73 In response to Senator
Lugar's statements that the amendment "muddied the waters" on preemption
and created an impression that the CAAA was not meant to preempt all
nonfederal government actions,74 House of Representatives members created in
debate a legislative history for the purpose of demonstrating unequivocally that
69. 132 CONG. REC. H6764 (daily ed. Sept. 12, 1986); see also id. at H6766 (prepared statement
of Representative SilIjander stating the Senate bill is silent on issue of federal preemption of local
divestment actions); id. at H6762 (memorandum from Paul T. Rephen, Chief Division of Legal
Counsel, The City of New York to Representative Solarz restating Senator D'Amato's intent not to
affect state and local divestment acts with his amendment concerning the bill's impact on state laws
requiring companies with which the governmental entity has contracts and that are funded in part
with federal money not to conduct business with South Africa). Parties to a suit involving the
validity of a Baltimore divestment ordinance indicated in their briefs that the CAAA did not contain
an express preemption. See Brief for Appellants at 33, Lubman v. Mayor and City Council of Balti-
more, No. 87-104 (Md. filed Oct. 9, 1987); Brief for Appellees at 44, Board of Trustees of the Em-
ployees' Retirement Sys. v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore City, No. 95-104 (Md. filed Nov.
16, 1987); accord Board of Trustees of Employees' Retirement Sys. of Baltimore v. Mayor and City
Council of Baltimore City, No. 86365065/CE-59858, slip op. at 20 (Cir. Ct. Bait. July 17, 1987)
(decision of Greenfield, J.).
70. 132 CONG. REc. H6779 (daily ed. Sept. 12, 1986) (statement of Senator Wolpe).
71. 132 CONG. REc. S11,815 (daily ed. Aug. 15, 1986) (Senator D'Amato introducing Amend-
ment No. 2753).
72. Id. at S11,817.
73. Id. at S11,817-818. The amendment as originally proposed was defeated by a 64-35 vote. A
second amendment passed that gave states and municipalities 90 days within which to amend their
procurement contract restrictions without the threat of having their federal subsidies withdrawn. Id.
at S11,818 (Senators D'Amato and Moynihan proposing Amendment No. 2754) (codified at 22
U.S.C.A. § 5116 (West Supp. 1988)).
74. 132 CONG. REc. S11,817 (daily ed. Aug. 15, 1986).
19893
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
the House of Representatives at least did not intend for the CAAA to preempt
state and local government divestment actibn. 75 This concern produced House
Resolution 548 which emphatically states: "[flt is not the intent of the House of
Representatives that the bill limit, preempt, or affect, in any fashion, the author-
ity of any State... to restrict or otherwise regulate any financial or commercial
activity respecting South Africa."' 76 Because the House of Representatives
clearly did not intend to preempt divestment acts, at a minimum, the resolution
raises sufficient doubt about congressional intent to prevent a court from infer-
ring preemption.
77
There remains the question whether North Carolina's Divestment Act
serves either to stymie congressional purpose or to render compliance with both
the state and federal statutes impossible. North Carolina's Act is not susceptible
to challenge on either basis. As noted earlier, Congress incorporated the Sulli-
van Principles in its Act, as did North Carolina.78 The standards by which
companies are judged under either statute are, therefore, the same. As a result, a
company could comply with both laws without undergoing any hardship or hav-
ing to follow any inconsistent practices. Nor does the North Carolina Act ob-
struct congressional purpose in the area of apartheid. The Act mirrors
congressional purpose in guiding United States companies' workplace behavior
in South Africa. The CAAA has a dual purpose of imposing federal economic
and trade sanctions against the Republic of South Africa using the United States
government, its businesses and citizens as the instruments for carrying out these
sanctions, and encouraging a policy of constructive engagement between Ameri-
can companies in South Africa and that nation. 79 The goal of the federal Act is
to eliminate apartheid. As the South African government makes changes to
reach that goal, the CAAA allows for a lessening of the sanctions against the
government.80 The effect of loosening the sanctions, when combined with the
goal of encouraging American companies to help end apartheid, is to provide
companies with a reason to become antiapartheid advocates in South Africa.
North Carolina provides the same type of incentive to companies by connecting
companies' productive involvement in South Africa with the economic benefit of
becoming or remaining eligible as investment targets of the state's funds.
Neither the CAAA nor the North Carolina Act provide for punitive measures
against companies. Both acts attempt to enti6e a company to remain in South
Africa under circumstances that will strengthen the possibility of establishing a
democratic, nonracist government. In conclusion, the legislative history of the
75. 132 CONG. REC. H6760 (daily ed. Sept. 12, 1986) (statements of Representatives Gray and
Leland).
76. H.R. Res. 548, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., 132 CONG. REC. H6758 (daily ed. Sept. 12, 1986).
77. See supra text accompanying note 43. Professor Tribe has stated that the individual com-
ments of Senator Lugar should not dictate finding Congress intended to preempt local actions or
receive greater weight than other congress members' comments. 132 CONG. REC. S12,535 (daily ed.
Sept. 15, 1986) (memorandum of Professor Tribe's argument that giving Senator Lugar's "isolated
comments" a determinative effect would "violate the spirit" of INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983),
which struck down the single house legislative veto).
78. See supra note 3 and text accompanying notes 61-66.
79. 22 U.S.C.A. § 5011 (West Supp. 1988).
80. Id. § 5061.
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CAAA and the fact that North Carolina's Divestment Act is based on the Sulli-
van Principles combine to make a strong case that the Divestment Act would
survive a preemption attack.8 1
The commerce clause of the United States Constitution poses a more seri-
ous threat to the North Carolina Act.82 Under a commerce clause analysis, the
constitutionality of the Act probably will turn on whether the state qualifies as a
market participant when it invests state retirement and trust funds.83 If the
state does qualify, the commerce clause inquiry ends.84 If the state does not
qualify as a market participant, the commerce clause analysis must proceed
under the balancing test enunciated in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.8 5 Whether the
Act could survive the Pike analysis is uncertain.
The United States Supreme Court enunciated the market participant doc-
trine in Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp.86 There the Court considered
whether the state of Maryland was involved in the scrap metal market as a par-
ticipant or as a regulator of the market when it paid scrap processors a bounty
for each abandoned car for which they showed a Maryland title existed.87 Be-
cause in-state scrap dealers had to provide less documentation to prove title,
they were treated more favorably than out-of-state processors.8 8 The Court con-
cluded that Maryland was not acting as a regulator and that "[n]othing in the
purposes animating the Commerce Clause prohibits a State, in the absence of
congressional action, from participating in the market and exercising the right to
favor its own citizens over others."
'89
The Court elaborated on the market participant doctrine in Reeves, Inc. v.
Stake90 and White v. Massachusetts Council of Construction Employers, Inc.9 1
In Reeves the Court stated that it had developed the doctrine out of a recogni-
tion that the traditional commerce clause analysis ignored several important
qualities of state proprietary actions. First, the tenth amendment and state sov-
ereignty- the role of each state "'as guardian and trustee for its people' "-
81. Appellants in the Baltimore divestment ordinance case implied strongly in their brief that
had the Baltimore ordinance been based on the Sullivan Principles, allowing companies to demon-
strate progress in their labor practices, it would have been safe from a preemption challenge. After
characterizing the CAAA as making the Sullivan Principles a "federally-mandated Code of Conduct
binding on American employers," appellants criticized the Baltimore ordinance for its lack of flexi-
bility in recognizing when a company makes progress on meeting the Code's standards. Brief for
Appellants at 44-46, Board of Trustees of the Employees' Retirement Sys. v. Mayor of Baltimore,
No. 87-95 (Md. filed Oct. 9, 1987); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 6-22, at 469 n.9
(1988) (local and state divestment acts not preempted by the CAAA).
82. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
83. Blaustein, supra note 6, at 80.
84. White v. Massachusetts Council of Constr. Employers, Inc., 460 U.S. 204, 208 (1983).
85. 397 U.S. 137 (1970). In Pike the Court wrote: "Where the statute regulates evenhandedly
to effectuate a legitimate public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it
will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the
putative local benefits." Id. at 142.
86. 426 U.S. 794 (1976).
87. Id. at 797.
88. Id. at 802.
89. Id. at 810.
90. 447 U.S. 429 (1980).
91. 460 U.S. 204 (1983).
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warranted a different stance than which the Pike approach provided in analyzing
state actions. 92 The Court noted that this sensitivity was required not only when
"integral operations" of the state were implicated, but in additional areas in
which "[s]tates may fairly claim some measure of a sovereign interest in retain-
ing freedom to decide how, with whom, and for whose benefit to deal."'93 Sec-
ond, the Court counseled restraint in light of the "'long recognized right of
trader ... engaged in an entirely private business, freely to exercise his own
independent discretion as to parties with whom he will deal.' "-94 When states
act as participants they should "similarly share existing freedoms from federal
constraints."' 95 Third, the Court noted that the issues state legislatures would be
considering relative to their proprietary activity would "often . . . be subtle,
complex, politically charged, and difficult to assess under traditional Commerce
Clause analysis."' 96 As a result, Congress was more appropriately situated than
the judiciary to address these issues.
97
White further contributed to an understanding of the market participant
doctrine by addressing, although not conclusively, the scope of the doctrine. In
White the Court addressed the question whether the Mayor of Boston's order
that "all construction projects funded in whole or in part by city funds, or funds
which the city had the authority to administer, should be performed by a work
force consisting of at least half bona fide residents of Boston" fell within the
market participant doctrine.98 The Court held that when the city used only its
own funds for public construction projects, it acted as a market participant. 99
The Court stated that governments did not have free rein to develop restrictions
that "reach beyond the immediate parties with which the government transacts
business." 1°° It concluded, however, that the outer limit was not defined by
"formal privity of contract."101 Because the mayor's order "cover[ed] a dis-
crete, identifiable class of economic activity in which the city [was] a major par-
ticipant," the order fell within the limits of the doctrine.102
Proponents of divestment argue simply that when a state is engaged in the
buying and selling of securities, it is involved in the investment market as a
participant,10 3 not as a regulator. As an investment market participant, the
92. Reeves, 447 U.S. at 438.
93. Id. at 438 n. 10 (citing The Supreme Court, 1975 Term, 90 HARV. L. REv. 1, 56, 63 (1976)).
94. Id. at 438-39 (quoting United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919)).
95. Id. at 439.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. White, 460 U.S. at 205-06.
99. Id. at 214-15.
100. Id. at 211 n.7.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Board of Trustees of the Employees' Retirement Sys. v. Mayor of Baltimore, No.
86365065/CE-59858, slip op. at 9-10 (Cir. Ct. Bait. July 17, 1987) (holding market participant doc-
trine applies to investment activity); Brief for Appellees at 36-37, Board of Trustees, (No. 87-95);
Lawyers' Committee, supra note 6, at 12-15. See also the pre-Alexander Scrap decision, American
Yearbook Co. v. Askew, 339 F. Supp. 719, 725 (M.D. Fla.) ("Trade regulations are clearly subject to
Commerce Clause restrictions, but statutes that merely specify the conditions of state purchases are
not."), aff'd, 409 U.S. 904 (1972).
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state has the right, as does a private investor, to decide with whom it will con-
duct its business.1 4 Antidivestment voices argue that the state is not engaged in
a proprietary action as a market participant when it dictates to a private indus-
try how to conduct its business. Opponents of divestment argue the state divest-
ment action is, therefore, purely regulatory.1
0 5
The Court's decision in Wisconsin Department of Industry, Labor and
Human Relations v. Gould, Inc. 106 is helpful in forecasting how a court might
view North Carolina's involvement with the securities industry. In Gould the
state of Wisconsin enacted legislation that forbade the state's purchasing agents
from buying products from manufacturers found guilty of three separate Na-
tional Labor Relations Act violations within a five year period. 10 7 The state
raised a market participant doctrine defense to the preemption challenge. In this
context the Court addressed the nature of regulatory versus proprietary state
activity. 10 8 Holding that the Wisconsin action was not proprietary, the Court
stated that "by flatly prohibiting state purchases from repeat labor law violators
Wisconsin 'simply is not functioning as a private purchaser of services'; for all
practical purposes, Wisconsin's debarment scheme is tantamount to regula-
tion." 10 9 Gould, therefore, suggests that when a statute has qualities of finality
and inflexibility, it will probably be viewed as regulatory.
Gould presented a situation analogous to North Carolina's Divestment Act
in that it involved a state legislature enacting a specific criterion for deciding
from whom the state could procure goods or services. The similarity stops
there, however. North Carolina does not use the Sullivan Principles to "flatly
prohibit" investments in particular companies. It uses the Principles flexibly.
Should a company not meet the appropriate Sullivan rankings in one year, it is
quite possible for it to meet them in subsequent years and thereby regain eligibil-
ity for investment consideration by the state. Because it is within a company's
control whether or not to meet the state's investment criteria, the criteria do not
act as a penalty, a prohibition, or regulation, and the state, therefore, qualifies as
a market participant when it purchases and sells stocks for those funds under its
control. Moreover, the Divestment Act covers only the state's involvement in
buying and selling securities, an action that would appear to meet the White test
104. Board of Trustees, No. 86365065/CE-59858, slip op. at 9-10; Brief for Appellees at 36-37,
Board of Trustees (No. 87-95); Lawyers' Committee, supra note 6, at 12-15.
105. Brief for Appellants at 54, Board of Trustees (No. 87-95); Blaustein, supra note 7, at 84. It
is apparent that how the question is framed can be crucial to the holding on this issue. A focus on a
state's right to decide with whom it will conduct business by virtue of its criteria is vastly different
from a focus on the state as dictating to business how it can become a candidate for a state's business.
Cf. L. TRIBE, supra note 81, § 6-11, at 433 (market participant-regulator decision may depend on
how facts or transaction is cast). Regulatory action includes preventing the sale or prohibiting the
flow of "privately owned articles of trade" in interstate commerce or requiring certain conditions to
be met before the sale or flow of goods within a state may occur. Reeves, 447 U.S. at 433 n.4, 435,
437 (citing examples of regulatory behavior).
106. 106 S. Ct. 1057 (1986).
107. Id. at 1059-60. Such violators' names would remain on a list the state maintained for three
years. Id. at 1060 n.1.
108. Id. at 1062-64.
109. Id. at 1062-63 (quoting Gould, Inc. v. Wisconsin Dep't of Indus., Labor & Human Rela-
tions, 750 F.2d 608, 614 (7th Cir. 1984) (citation omitted)).
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of a "discrete, identifiable class of economic activity in which the state is a major
participant."' 10
Critics of divestment also attack the appropriateness of applying the market
participant theory by arguing that it applies only when a state action operates to
favor that state's citizens economically.II Although some of the market partici-
pant cases use language from which that requirement might fairly be implied, '
12
a few commentators have interpreted the holding of Alexandria Scrap to support
a state's goal of promoting state aesthetic and environmental concerns.113 Addi-
tionally in K.S.B. Technical Sales Corp. v. North Jersey District Water Supply
Commission. 14 the New Jersey Supreme Court acknowledged that the market
participant doctrine could apply to the public health and welfare interests of the
state.' 15 These holdings, combined with the Court's original explanations for
why situations where the state was acting in a market participant capacity re-
quired different analysis than the traditional commerce clause situation,
11 6
demonstrate that the market participant doctrine probably applies to the Divest-
ment Act, and the state, like a private investor, may decide with whom it wishes
to conduct its business, using criteria that will best promote the goals it wishes to
attain.
117
In addition to its grant of congressional power over interstate commerce,
the commerce clause grants Congress power "to regulate Commerce with for-
eign Nations."' 18 The Divestment Act directly implicates the foreign commerce
clause because it applies its criteria to companies incorporated outside of the
United States as well as to those incorporated within the United States." t9 For-
eign commerce clause analysis varies from the interstate commerce analysis in
110. White, 460 U.S. at 211 n.7.
111. See Brief for Appellants at 52-53, Board of Trustees (No. 87-95).
112. See White, 460 U.S. at 211 n.7 (everyone affected by mayoral order "is, in a substantial if
informal sense, 'working for the city' "); Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 430 & n.1 (1980)
(construction of cement plant and subsequent confinement of sale of cement to residents of the state
was rooted in the history of progressive political party and in the sense that cement shortages were
"threatening the people of this state"); Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 810 (1976)
(commerce clause does not prohibit a state from "participating in the market and exercising the right
to favor its own citizens over others").
113. Board of Trustees, No. 86365065/CE-59858, slip op. at 11 (citing Alexandria Scrap, 426
U.S. at 809); Brief for Appellees at 36-37, Board of Trustees (No. 87-95). Contra Reeves, 447 U.S. at
442 n.16 (characterizing environmentalism as state's goal in Alexandria Scrap as "oversimplifica-
tion;" "[the central point of Alexandria Scrap was that the demonstration of an 'independent justifi-
cation' was unnecessary to sustain the State's program").
114. 75 NJ. 272, 381 A.2d 774 (1977), appeal dismissed, 435 U.S. 982 (1978).
115. Id. at 298, 381 A.2d at 787.
116. See supra notes 90-97 and accompanying text.
117. A number of congressional leaders voiced this opinion repeatedly during the debates on the
CAAA, although it is likely that they did not have either the commerce clause or the market partici-
pant theory in mind. Their statements more probably reflect the common-sense notion that the
states should not be told how they can invest their own money. Because divestment represents a
highly emotional matter on a number of fronts, including states' rights, general public sentiments
relating to divestment issues should be borne in mind. See 132 CONG. REc. H6760, H6764, H6778
(daily ed. Sept. 12, 1986) (statements of Representatives Gray, Weiss, Levine, and Wolpe); see also
L. TRIBE, supra note 81, § 6-21, at 469 (state is "free to pass laws forbidding investment of the state's
pension funds in companies that do business with South Africa" under market participant doctrine).
118. U.S. CONsT. art I, § 8, cl. 3.
119. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 147-69.2(b)(8) (1987).
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that it is more "rigorous" and may well preclude a state from invoking the mar-
ket participant doctrine.120 To withstand a foreign commerce clause challenge,
the general assembly would need to amend the Act to limit its scope to compa-
nies incorporated only within the United States.
The more extensive scrutiny that has evolved for foreign commerce clause
cases requires two inquiries. One inquiry is whether the state law "impair[s]
federal uniformity in an area where federal uniformity is essential." 121 The
character of this inquiry is one of preemption 122 and is not involved in consider-
ing North Carolina's Divestment Act. 123 The second inquiry is whether the state
law "prevents the Federal Government from 'speaking with one voice when reg-
ulating commercial relations with foreign governments.'"124 A state law at
odds with "federal policy will violate the 'one voice' standard if it either impli-
cates foreign policy issues which must be left to the Federal Government or
violates a clear federal directive."' 125 Under the "one voice" test, the Court has
said, "[I]f a state [law] merely has foreign resonances, but does not implicate
foreign affairs," the Court will not infer that the subject requires uniformity
among the states without a direct instruction from Congress.
12 6
As a preliminary matter, it must be noted that the foreign commerce clause
applies to regulation. 127 As discussed earlier, North Carolina's Act should not
be held to be a regulation because it is not tantamount to a total prohibition
under the Gould test. 128 The Act covers a discrete economic activity under the
White test-buying and selling securities-and involves an activity in which the
state acts "'like private individuals and businesses [and should, as a result], en-
joy[ ] the unrestricted power to... determine those with whom it will deal, and
to fix the terms and conditions upon which it will make needed purchases.' "129
Beyond this argument, however, it is necessary to decide if the Act rises to
the level of "implicating foreign affairs." One analysis is required to answer this
question as it relates to companies incorporated in the United States, and a sec-
ond analysis is required for the Act's application to companies incorporated
outside the United States. The next issue to be addressed is whether the Act
120. See South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 95-96 (1984) (Reeves deci-
sion does not allow states complete freedom to adopt any regulations they please); Reeves, Inc. v.
Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 437-38 n.9 (1980) ("Commerce Clause scrutiny may well be more rigorous
when a restraint on foreign commerce is alleged").
121. Japan Line, Ltd. v. City of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 448 (1979).
122. Id.
123. See supra notes 43-81 and accompanying text for preemption discussion.
124. Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 451 (quoting Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276, 285
(1976)). A further concern involves the risk of multiple taxation which is not relevant to the divest-
ment issue. Id. at 446.
125. Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 194 (1983).
126. Id.
127. See supra note 118 and accompanying text; see also Brief for Appellees at 60, Board of
Trustees (No. 87-95) (Baltimore ordinance not violative of foreign commerce clause because it "gov-
ern[s] ... [the] investment of City funds" and does not regulate foreign commerce).
128. See supra notes 106-09 and accompanying text.
129. Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 439 n.12 (1980) (quoting Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co.,
310 U.S. 113, 127 (1940)); Brief for Appellees at 60, Board of Trustees (No. 87-95); see supra notes
98-110 and accompanying text.
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implicates foreign affairs when it prescribes investment criteria that United
States companies must meet before the state can consider investing in them.
The appropriate precedent for this situation is Container Corp. of America
v. Franchise Tax Board130 This case involved a challenge to a California statute
that authorized the state to tax income of domestic corporations without regard
to whether they had foreign subsidiaries.13 1 The crucial question for the Court
was whether the tax would implicate foreign policy issues by "offending" a for-
eign nation or causing "significant foreign retaliation."' 132 The Court prefaced
its discussion by noting its lack of competence in second guessing how a foreign
nation might react to a state's actions. As a consequence, its decision could be
guided only by "general observations about the imperatives of international
trade and international relations."' 133 The Court placed great emphasis on the
fact that the tax was imposed on domestic, and not foreign, corporations.
34 It
also emphasized that the "legal incidence" of the tax would fall only on domes-
tic corporations. 135 The Court concluded that any offense to a foreign nation
would be indirect, based solely on a foreign country's general interest in the state
action and, therefore, would be "attenuated at best." 136 The Court further em-
phasized that the "nuances" of foreign policy were best left to the control of the
executive and legislative branches of government. Because Congress had shown
no desire to control a state's domestic corporation tax plan and the federal gov-
ernment had not filed an amicus brief in the case, the Court concluded that the
state statute was "in reality of local rather than international concern." 1 37
As far as North Carolina's Divestment Act affects domestically incorpo-
rated companies, it parallels Container Corp. First, the statute's effect relates to
American companies. Second, any effect on South Africa is collateral and
would involve the courts in second guessing that country's reactions. The eco-
nomic and trade sanctions the CAAA imposes on South Africa 38 would compel
a court to find that the Divestment Act could not realistically result in a "signifi-
cant retaliatory" response from South Africa. Third, as the preemption discus-
sion above demonstrated, Congress took no steps to preclude states from
enacting divestment statutes related to pension fund investments, thus support-
ing a view that Congress considers the issue of retirement fund investment to be
one of local concern.' 39 Finally, the Divestment Act presents essentially the
same message to American companies involved in South Africa (and to the Re-
public of South Africa for that matter) as does the CAAA.140 The North Caro-
130. 463 U.S. 159 (1983).
131. Id. at 162-63.
132. Id. at 194.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 195.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 195-96.
138. See supra text accompanying notes 53-60 for listing of the federal bans on trading with
South Africa.
139. See supra notes 69-77 and accompanying text.
140. See supra notes 78-80 and accompanying text.
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lina Divestment Act, as it applies to domestically incorporated companies, does
not rise to the level of implicating foreign affairs by presenting a danger of caus-
ing offense or violating the one voice standard.
1 4 1
The next inquiry-whether the Divestment Act's application to companies
incorporated in a foreign nation mandates a finding that it implicates foreign
affairs- presents difficulties. This inquiry calls for a comparison of the Court's
rationale in Container Corp. with its holding in Japan Line, Ltd. v. City of Los
Angeles. 142 Japan Line was the forerunner of Container Corp. and also involved
a state statute providing for a tax on corporations. Unlike the tax considered in
Container Corp., the Japan Line tax was imposed on property of both domestic
and foreign incorporated companies. This fact contributed to the finding that
the statute directly affected foreign commerce and could reasonably result in
offense to foreign nations.143 The Court in Container Corp. partially relied on
this distinction in holding that the income tax limited to domestic corporations
was constitutional. 144 Japan Line and Container Corp. argue strongly for the
position that the general assembly should revise the Divestment Act to limit its
application solely to companies incorporated domestically. With this change,
the Divestment Act would refrain from directly affecting relations with the na-
tion's foreign trading partners and so would be more likely to avoid a foreign
commerce clause challenge.
The final constitutional challenge to the Divestment Act is whether Con-
gress' power over foreign affairs matters should prohibit the state from enacting
a divestment act. Professor Louis Henkin has identified both express and im-
plicit sources of Congress' power over foreign affairs matters.145 No explicit
constitutional limitation applies to the divestment context. 146 The question
therefore revolves around whether an implicit limitation bears on the state's in-
volvement with foreign nations through the Divestment Act. Beyond the im-
plicit limitations the commerce clause places on states,' 47 Henkin describes a
"larger [limiting] principle" of federal control over foreign affairs. 148 This sec-
ond implicit limitation is the doctrine proscribing state action in foreign affairs
141. But see Brief for Appellants at 57, Board of Trustees, No. 87-95 (risk of offense is great
because divestment ordinance focuses on one nation); Brief for Appellants at 32, Lubman v. Mayor
of Baltimore, (No. 87-104) (danger great because of cumulative effect of divestment statutes); VIR-
GINIA Note, supra note 6, at 837 (discrimination against one nation makes "offense a virtual cer-
tainty and retaliation a strong possibility").
142. 441 U.S. 434, 451 (1979). The Japan Line decision did not purport to apply to a tax im-
posed on "domestically owned instrumentalities engaged in foreign commerce." Id. at 444 n.7.
143. Id. at 444 & n.7, 452-54.
144. Container Corp., 463 U.S. at 187-89, 195. In Board of Trustees it was significant to the
Baltimore Circuit Court judge's decision that the Baltimore ordinance applied only to "domestically
owned companies engaged in foreign commerce, rather than foreign companies doing business in the
United States." Board of Trustees, No. 86365065/CE-59858, slip op. at 18.
145. L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 228-244 (1972).
146. U.S. CONsT. art I, § 10 (prohibiting states from entering into treaties, alliances, and confed-
erations; from imposing duties on imports or exports without Congressional consent and without a
showing that such duties are "absolutely necessary for executing [their] inspection Laws"; and from
entering into agreements with foreign countries without congressional consent).
147. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; see L. HENKIN, supra note 145, at 234-35. See supra notes 118-44 for
discussion of foreign commerce clause and divestment.
148. L. HENKIN, supra note 145, at 238.
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when the federal government has not acted. 149 He notes this implied limitation
is a "new constitutional doctrine" that emerged in the Supreme Court's 1968
decision Zschernig v. Miller.15 0 This case has become the focus of discussions on
the constitutionality of divestment acts on a foreign affairs basis. 151
In Zschernig the Court considered the constitutionality of an Oregon pro-
bate statute. The statute contained a reciprocity provision requiring that Ameri-
can citizens be able to take property left to them in a foreign country in the same
manner as that country's citizens before foreign nationals could receive Ameri-
can based property. The statute also required that "foreign heirs [be able] to
receive the proceeds of Oregon estates 'without confiscation.' "152 Although a
treaty existed that potentially could have answered the constitutionality issue on
a preemption ground, the Court framed the issue solely in terms of whether the
statute, as applied, infringed on the power of the federal government to handle
foreign affairs matters when there had been no federal action.153 The Court's
foreign affairs power discussion drew heavily on statements from an earlier case
in which a state statute involving foreign affairs was challenged on a preemption
ground.
"[T]he supremacy of the national power in the general field of
foreign affairs ... is made clear by the Constitution, was pointed out
by the authors of The Federalist in 1787, and has since been given
continuous recognition by this Court .... For local interests the sev-
eral States of the Union exist, but for national purposes, embracing our
relations with foreign nations, we are but one people, one nation, one
power. Our system of government.., requires that federal power in
the field affecting foreign relations be left entirely free from local
interference." 1
5 4
Against this backdrop, the Zschernig Court declared that the Oregon stat-
ute's confiscation inquiry required courts to examine "whether there is in the
actual administration in the particular foreign system of law any element of con-
fiscation." 155 This demanded "minute inquiries" into how the foreign nation
actually applied its laws and "into the credibility of foreign diplomatic state-
ments." 156 Such excursions went beyond the permissible "routine reading"
standard previously enunciated. 157
149. L. HENKIN, supra note 145, at 238-44.
150. 389 U.S. 429 (1968); L. HENKIN, supra note 145, at 238-39.
151. Board of Trustees v. Mayor of Baltimore, No. 86365065/CE-59858, slip op. at 11-16; Brief
for Appellants at 13-16, Lubman v. Mayor of Baltimore, No. 87-104; Brief for Appellants at 35-41,
Board of Trustees (No.87-95); Brief for Appellees at 48-57, Board of Trustees (No. 87-95); Blaustein,
supra note 6, at 91-94; see Lewis, supra note 6, at 509-16; CINCINNATI Note, supra note 6, at 568-74;
PACIFIc Note, supra note 6, at 227-28; VIRGINIA Note, supra note 6, at 84246.
152. Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 431 (quoting OR. REV. STAT. § 111.070 (1957)).
153. Id. at 443, 457 (Harlan, J., concurring).
154. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 62-63 (1941) (quoting The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130
U.S. 581, 606 (1889)) (footnotes omitted).
155. Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 434.
156. Id. at 435.
157. Id. at 433 (characterizing the Court's ruling in Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503 (1947)). Clark
is discussed infra at text accompanying notes 174-83.
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The case does not fully clarify the scope of the doctrine of federal control
over foreign affairs. The statements the Court drew from the preemption arena
suggest complete inflexibility, a per se standard that any state action involving
foreign affairs in any way will automatically be found unconstitutional. Oppo-
nents of divestment statutes interpret the case as presenting such a per se rule.15 8
The weight of authority, however, is against interpreting Zschernig as
presenting a per se rule. Professor Henkin has stated that Zschernig's scope "is
yet to be determined." 159 Another commentator has said that the answer to
whether Zschernig stands for a per se holding can "not be found in restudying
opinion."' 160 A New Jersey court has interpreted Zschernig to permit "state reg-
ulation which does not result demonstrably in a significant and direct impact
upon foreign affairs."' 16 1 An Illinois court has stated that it would be an "over-
simplification and wrong to assert that no State law which has any impact what-
soever upon foreign relations may ever stand."' 62 Language in Zschernig itself
also appears to leave room for states to act in ways that affect foreign affairs, as
long as the action would have only an "incidental or indirect effect in foreign
countries," 16 3 not cause "great potential for disruption or embarrassment,"' 164
or would not "impair the effective exercise of the Nation's foreign policy.'
6 5
The issue that arises, therefore, is what level of state action touching on
foreign affairs is permissible. The answer is far from clear. Professor Henkin
has suggested that it may emerge from developing a new balancing test that
weighs the state's interest in a particular action against that action's potential to
impair the federal government's ability to deal with foreign affairs.166 This Note
acts on that suggestion and proposes such a balancing test, identifying and ap-
plying its elements to several foreign affairs cases and North Carolina's Divest-
ment Act.
Before embarking on a foreign affairs analysis, it is essential to inquire
whether the federal government has acted in the area which the state action
addresses. If the federal government has acted and the state law conflicts with
it, preemption principles should control to declare the state action unconstitu-
tional.' 67 Several cases cited for foreign affairs analysis purposes are really pre-
158. See Brief for Appellants at 14, Board of Trustees (No. 87-104) (once it is established that a
state statute has a foreign affairs "purpose," it is automatically invalid); Blaustein, supra note 6, at 93
(asking whether Zschernig established a per se rule); cf. VIRGINIA Note, supra note 6, at 846
(Zschernig "unmistakably" forbids states from condemning foreign nations). Contra Brief for Ap-
pellees at 51, Board of Trustees (No. 87-95) ("Zschernig is precedent of limited force").
159. L. HENKIN, supra note 145, at 238.
160. Blaustein, supra note 6, at 93.
161. K.S.B. Tech. Sales Corp. v. North Jersey Dist. Water Supply Comm'n, 75 N.J. 272, 293,
381 A.2d 774, 784 (1977), appeal dismissed, 435 U.S. 982 (1978).
162. Springfield Rare Coin Galleries, Inc. v. Johnson, 115 Ill. 2d 221, 233, 503 N.E.2d 300, 306
(1986).
163. Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 434 (1968).
164. Id. at 435.
165. Id. at 440.
166. L. HENKIN, supra note 145, at 241 (comparing the commerce clause balancing test); Lewis,
supra note 6, at 509, 516 (discussing parallel to commerce clause); cf. Zschering, 389 U.S. at 441.
167. See Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 443 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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emption cases and, therefore, are not particularly fitting precedents for foreign
affairs issues. 168
If the preemption analysis does not serve to strike down a state statute, two
possibilities emerge. First, the federal government has not acted in the area with
which the state action is concerned, or second, the government has acted, but
insufficient evidence exists to find the state law is preempted. The distinction
between these alternatives will become important later in applying the proposed
balancing test. 
169
A second major distinction within the balancing test is whether the state
law involves the state acting in a regulatory or a proprietary role. Regulatory
roles, as defined under commerce clause analysis, generally involve state taxing
measures or efforts that impede free trade by providing for embargoes or boy-
cotts of goods or services, or otherwise restricting how or whether trade can be
conducted within a state's borders.170 A state acts in a proprietary capacity
when it enters the marketplace as a purchaser of goods or services for its own
use.1 71 The distinction between regulatory and proprietary capacities is impor-
tant because courts have generally acknowledged that "[l]ike private individuals
and businesses, the Government enjoys the unrestricted power to produce its
own supplies, to determine those with whom it will deal, and to fix the terms and
conditions upon which it will make needed purchases."
172
The majority of cases involving a foreign affairs challenge to state action
involve regulatory behavior. Two of the leading cases, Zschernig 173 and Clark
168. See, e.g., Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 74 (1941) (Court held the Pennsylvania Alien
Registration Act stood in conflict with the federal Alien Registration Act and was, as a result,
preempted); see also Blaustein, supra note 6, at 91 (result in Hines may be explained "as much by the
Supremacy Clause as by any inherent inability of states to act in any matter affecting foreign af-
fairs"). The Court explicitly left unanswered whether the federal power over foreign affairs, "exer-
cised or unexercised, is exclusive." Hines, 312 U.S. at 62. Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503 (1947),
properly disposed of one aspect of the constitutionality of a California probate statute that required
reciprocity by stating that when a pertinent federal treaty's provisions were in conflict with the
state's provisions, the federal law took precedent over the contrary state law. Id. at 506 n.l, 508-10,
516. Tayyari v. New Mexico State Univ., 495 F. Supp. 1365 (D. N. Mex. 1980), could have been
handled solely on a preemption basis. In this case the New Mexico State University Board of Re-
gents had passed a resolution denying Iranian students admission or readmission to the University
until American hostages in Iran were released unharmed. Id. at 1368. In discussing the constitu-
tionality of the action, the court stated "[the federal government has already spoken with respect to
how Iranians in our land should be treated." Id. at 1378. The government had taken no action to
revoke Iranians' visas; therefore, the university motion intruded on that federal position. Id.
169. See infra text following note 210.
170. Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 435, 437, 445 (1980) (describing state regulatory
actions).
171. Id. at 435, 437.
172. Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113, 127 (1940) (establishing federal government's
right to require those from whom it buys materials to pay their employees minimum wage). The
Court in Lukens Steel specifically characterized the federal act requiring vendors to pay minimum
wages as not being an "exercise by Congress of regulatory power over private business or employ-
ment." Id. at 128; see also Reeves, 447 U.S. at 439 n.12 (citing Lukens Steel as support for a state
government's right to fix conditions on state purchases); Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S.
794, 824 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (state acting in a proprietary capacity of "purchasing items
of commerce for end use" falls outside commerce clause restraints).
173. See supra notes 150-57 and accompanying text.
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v. Allen, 174 involved state statutes regulating descent and distribution of probate
estates.
One issue before the Clark court was whether a California probate statute
which contained a reciprocity provision like that in Zschernig, but without the
Zschernig statute's confiscation element, 175 represented a facially unconstitu-
tional intrusion by the state into foreign affairs. 176 The Court characterized as
"farfetched" the argument that the statute "promote[d] the right[s] of American
citizens to inherit abroad by offering to aliens reciprocal rights of inheritance in
California." 177 The Court then proceeded to discuss the constitutionality of the
statute from three perspectives. First, probate laws were matters of "local
law." 178 Second, no federal law, treaty, or policy existed that preempted the
state's law on the issue of the disposition of personal property. 179 Third, the
state law did not violate any express constitutional provision concerning state
involvement with foreign nations.180 Concluding on the basis of this analysis
that the statute was constitutional, the Court stated that although the statute
would "have some incidental or indirect effect in foreign countries ... [t]hat is
true of many state laws which none would claim cross the forbidden line."
s181
This aspect of the Clark analysis thus supports the proposition that a state law
relating to a matter of foreign affairs can withstand a foreign affairs constitu-
tional challenge even when the government has not acted if the law deals with a
matter traditionally local and has only an indirect effect on foreign affairs.
18 2
The holding was later characterized by the Court in Zschernig as permitting a
"routine reading" of foreign law.183
New York Times Co. v. City of New York Commission on Human Rights
18 4
is another regulatory case. There the court addressed whether the New York
Times had aided or abetted in violating a city antidiscrimination law by publish-
ing advertisements for employment in the Republic of South Africa. 185 The law
was clearly regulatory in nature. The Commission on Human Relations held,
after conducting an inquiry on South Africa's employment practices and laws,
that the use of "South Africa" in employment advertisements was "code" for
the "principle of white supremacy."1 8 6 The New York Court of Appeals found
174. 331 U.S. 503 (1947).
175. Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 430-31.
176. Id. at 508, 516. See supra note 168 for a brief statement concerning the Court's initial
preemption inquiry.
177. Clark, 331 U.S. at 516-17.




182. Lewis, supra note 6, at 513; see CINCINNATI Note, supra note 6, at 572.
183. Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 433.
184. 41 N.Y.2d 345, 361 N.E.2d 963 (1977).
185. Id. at 346, 361 N.E.2d at 964. The law prohibited employers from printing "'any state-
ment, advertisement or publication [which] express[ed], directly or indirectly, any limitation, specifi-
cation or discrimination as to . . . race . . . or any intent to make such limitation ... '
(Administrative Code, § B1-7.0, subd 1, par [d].)." Id. at 349-50, 361 N.E.2d at 966.
186. Id. at 348, 361 N.E.2d at 965.
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that "South Africa" was not such a code and, therefore, the paper had not aided
in violating the antidiscrimination law by printing advertisements that allegedly
implied discrimination. The court stated, however, that finding was "not at the
heart of [the] case." 187 The real issue, in the court's view, was that the Commis-
sion's decision in effect "impose[d] an economic boycott... [on] the Republic of
South Africa."1 88 Thus, the application of the antidiscrimination law amounted
to the city adopting its own foreign policy-an intrusion on the federal govern-
ment's authority over foreign affairs.189 The court further stated that the "com-
mission [had] conducted an inquiry that might have been considered offensive by
the Republic of South Africa and which might have been an embarrassment to
those charged with the conduct of our Nation's foreign policy."'
190
Springfield Rare Coin Galleries, Inc. v. Johnson 191 presents another case of
a state regulatory action affecting the Republic of South Africa. In this case the
state of Illinois had enacted a tax exemption for legal tender, including gold,
issued by all governments except South Africa. 192 The court ignored the Fed-
eral Anti-Apartheid Act insofar as it affected prospectively the importation of
South African krugerrands 193 and, therefore, addressed only whether "Illinois
may impose a discriminatory tax on the sale of products of a single foreign na-
tion as an expression of disapproval of that nation's policies, and as a disincen-
tive to invest in that nation's products."' 94 The court held the statute
unconstitutional on three grounds. First, the law was motivated by disapproval
of South Africa's apartheid policy.195 Second, by focusing on a single nation,
the "ability of this country to choose between a range of policy options in devel-
oping its foreign policy in relation to the Republic of South Africa would be
compromised by the existence of State-sponsored sanctions which the Federal
government could not remove or modify to fit changing conditions."' 196 Third,
the effect of the statute was to create an embargo or boycott which was "outside
the realm of permissible State activity."' 197
Two cases involved a state acting in a proprietary capacity. 198 Both in-
volved "Buy American" statutes. In Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Board of Commis-
sioners of the Department of Water & Power of Los Angeles 199 a California court
considered a foreign affairs challenge to a California statute requiring that "con-
tracts for the construction of public works or the purchase of materials for pub-
187. Id. at 351, 361 N.E.2d at 968.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 352-53, 361 N.E.2d at 968.
190. Id. at 353, 361 N.E.2d at 969. See supra note 164 and accompanying text for comparison of
quoted language with the Zschernig court's language.
191. 115 Ill. 2d 221, 503 N.E.2d 300 (1986).
192. Id. at 225, 503 N.E.2d at 302.
193. Id. at 227, 503 N.E.2d at 303; see supra note 55 and accompanying text.
194. Springfield Rare Coin, 115 Il1. 2d at 227, 503 N.E.2d at 303.
195. Id. at 236, 503 N.E.2d at 307.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. See supra notes 170-72 and accompanying text.
199. 276 Cal. App. 2d 221, 80 Cal. Rptr. 800 (1969).
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lie use be awarded only to persons who ... agree to use or supply materials...
manufactured . . . [or substantially produced] in the United States. ' ' 200 The
statute provided no flexibility in meeting this requirement. After reviewing the
foreign affairs power, the court concluded that the statute "effectively plac[ed]
an embargo on foreign products [and] amount[ed] to a usurpation by [the] state
of the power of the federal government to conduct foreign trade policy."20 1 Pol-
icy reasons that may have motivated the state's action were irrelevant to the
court in holding the statute unconstitutional. The court also did not consider
relevant whether the state law was in conflict with any federal trade policy, stat-
ing that the federal power to determine foreign trade policy "whether or not
exercised, is exclusive."
'20 2
K.S.B. Technical Sales Corp. v. North Jersey District Water Supply Commis-
sion 203 involved a New Jersey "Buy American" statute. This statute provided
that state contracts for which the state paid any portion had to use products
manufactured in the United States " 'whenever available.' "204 Another section
of the statute elaborated on the "availability" stipulation by permitting
nondomestic items to be used when the use of domestic products would be
'impracticable... or... would unreasonably increase the cost.' "205
The court initially found that the New Jersey statute was not preempted by
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, an international pact to which the
United States was a party.20 6 It then considered whether the statute nonetheless
violated the federal government's power over foreign affairs. The court found
that the statute did not fall prey to the problem of evaluating the administration
of foreign governments.2 0 7 Because the statute applied to all foreign nations, it
was not motivated by disagreement with a particular country's political stances
or political climate.208 Moreover, the statute provided public officials with the
flexibility to purchase or use foreign products when cost, public welfare, and
practicality dictated.20 9 Finally, the court viewed the state action as consistent
with the federal government's approach to foreign trade policy so that the state
law did not have a "significant and direct impact upon foreign affairs."
'2 10
From these cases it is possible to identify the elements of the proposed bal-
ancing test and what effect each would have on the decisions discussed and the
North Carolina Divestment Act. First, does the state law in question represent
the state government acting in a regulatory or a proprietary capacity? A finding
200. Id. at -, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 801-02.
201. Id. at -, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 803.
202. Id. at -, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 804 n.9. The quoted phrase seems to be a direct answer to the
question that the Hines court expressly left open. See supra note 168.
203. 75 N.J. 272, 381 A.2d 774 (1977), appeal dismissed, 435 U.S. 982 (1978).
204. Id. at 278, 381 A.2d at 776 (quoting N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:32-1 (West 1939)).
205. Id. at 279, 381 A.2d at 777 (quoting N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:33-3 OVest 1939)).
206. Id. at 280-89, 381 A.2d at 777-82. See also supra notes 167-68 and accompanying text
discussing the preemption analysis as a necessary prelude to conducting the foreign affairs analysis.
207. Id. at 291, 381 A.2d at 783.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 293, 381 A.2d at 784.
210. Id.
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that the state is acting in a proprietary capacity should weigh heavily on the side
of favoring the constitutionality of the state action. A finding that the state is
engaging in a regulatory action will weigh heavily against its constitutionality.
Second, has the federal government acted in the area with which the state law is
concerned? A finding that the federal government has not acted should weigh
heavily against the constitutionality of the state law. If the government has
acted-and presuming the federal law has not preempted the state law- a court
must ascertain whether Congress has granted discretion to the executive branch
to carry out the federal law and if so, how much. The greater the level of discre-
tion the federal law grants to the executive branch in carrying out the law, the
greater the possibility that the existence of state and local actions on the subject
could create a subtle pressure on the executive which would interfere with its
ability to exercise its discretion in selecting a course of action. As a result, as the
amount of discretion given to the executive branch increases, there is a corre-
spondingly greater need to counter the ability of localities to impede the use of
that discretion. Thus, high discretion will weigh against the state's ability to act
in the same area.211 If the federal government has acted, it is also important to
consider whether the state act serves to reiterate federal positions. Third, does
the state law effectively operate as an embargo or boycott on foreign goods or
services? An affirmative answer to this question will weigh against the constitu-
tionality of the state statute. Fourth, does the state law single out a particular
nation or nations? If it does, the strength of the state's interest will be weakened.
Fifth, is the state statute motivated by disapproval for a foreign country's polit-
ical ideology or climate? Again, an affirmative response will weigh against the
state. Finally, does the state law require more than a routine reading of foreign
laws? If it does, the statute will fall prey to the shortcoming of the Oregon
probate statute considered in Zschernig.2
12
The proposed balancing test produces results consistent with the cases dis-
cussed in the foreign affairs area. The Zschernig statute would be unconstitu-
tional under the balancing test approach. The statute was regulatory in nature.
The federal government had not acted. As applied, the statute was viewed as
being motivated by disapproval of the political nature of foreign governments.
The law required "minute inquiries" into the actual administration of a coun-
try's laws.213 The effect of the statute was to impose an embargo of sorts on the
ability of foreign citizens to receive estate proceeds. These factors overwhelm
the fact that the statute applied to all foreign nations.214 Because the proposed
balancing test gives great weight to finding a state statute unconstitutional when
the state action is regulatory and the federal government has not acted, the
Clark statute would be likely to fail under the balancing test in spite of the fact
that it did not require a searching inquiry into the actual administration of a
211. Cf Springfield Rare Coins, Inc. v. Johnson, 115 Ill. 2d 221, 236, 503 N.E.2d 300, 307
(1986) (federal government's foreign policy options would be compromised by existence of state
sanctions against foreign countries).
212. See supra text accompanying notes 152-56.
213. Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 435 (1968); see supra note 156 and accompanying text.
214. See supra notes 150-65 and accompanying text for the discussion of Zschernig.
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foreign nation and applied to all nations without regard to political considera-
tions. 2 15 The New York Times decision would not change under the balancing
test. The state interest was regulatory. The federal government had not acted.
The law's effect was to create an economic boycott against a particular nation.
In applying the law, the commission engaged in an inquiry of how the Republic
of South Africa operated and what its laws were. The commission decision,
therefore, resulted in singling out a nation and expressing disapproval towards
its racist policies. 216 The Springfield Rare Coin decision also would not change
by applying the balancing test. The state action was regulatory. The federal
government had not acted. The statute singled out a particular country against
which a boycott was imposed in order to express disapproval for that nation's
policies. These factors overwhelm the fact that the statute did not require con-
ducting a detailed inquiry into the administration of the South African
government.
2 17
Although the Bethlehem Steel decision under the balancing test would re-
sult in holding the statute unconstitutional, it would be an easy task to amend
the law to make it constitutional. The state action was proprietary, thereby
weighing strongly in favor of the statute. The federal government had acted and
the state law was broadly consistent with that federal policy if the K.S.B. court's
findings on these points are accepted.2 18 The statute applied to all foreign na-
tions, was not motivated by considerations of foreign ideology, and did not re-
quire any inquiry into how foreign nations conducted their governmental
operations. The sole element weighing against the constitutionality of the stat-
ute-its embargo effect- easily could be amended by permitting state officials to
use or purchase foreign products under reasonable circumstances. 2 19 It follows
from the Bethlehem Steel discussion that the New Jersey statute in K.S.B. would
be found constitutional under the balancing test as long as the level of federal
discretion under the international trade agreement was not high.
220
Before applying the balancing test to the North Carolina Divestment Act it
is useful to note the advantages the test provides compared to current foreign
affairs analysis. First, the test puts to rest the controversy over whether
Zschernig presents a per se rule and demonstrates the fallacy of that argu-
ment.221 Second, the test gives appropriate consideration and weight to two
crucial factors: a state's sovereign interest in performing proprietary actions
222
and the level of discretion the federal government needs in carrying out its for-
eign affairs policy when the federal government has acted.22 3 Third, the test
clearly enunciates additional elements that could impede the federal govern-
215. See supra notes 174-83 and accompanying text for a discussion of Clark.
216. See supra notes 184-90 and accompanying text for a discussion of New York Times.
217. See supra notes 191-97 and accompanying text for a discussion of Springfield Rare Coins.
218. See supra text accompanying notes 206, 210.
219. See supra notes 199-202 and accompanying text for a discussion of Bethlehem Steel.
220. See supra notes 203-10 and accompanying text for a discussion of K.S.B.
221. See supra notes 158-65 and accompanying text.
222. See supra notes 170-72 and accompanying text.
223. See supra note 196 and accompanying text and text accompanying note 211.
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ment's ability to conduct foreign affairs and thus provides states with guidance
on how to avoid interfering with that function.
224
In applying the balancing test to North Carolina's Divestment Act, it is
clear that the Act falls within a proprietary realm and, therefore, begins with a
favored status. The fact that the Act does not impose or result in an embargo or
boycott, but provides some level of flexibility also weighs in favor of its constitu-
tionality.225 Furthermore, the Act does not require a searching inquiry into
how the South African government operates. Countering these elements favor-
ing the Divestment Act, however, are the facts that the Act expressly singles out
one nation to voice dissatisfaction with the Republic of South Africa's policy of
apartheid. Because the federal government has acted, the inquiry must proceed
to consideration of the CAAA and the amount of discretion the federal Anti-
Apartheid Act grants to the executive branch in carrying out federal policy.
The fact that the CAAA itself singles out the Republic of South Africa for the
express purpose of trying to eliminate its policy of apartheid should nullify the
negative weight given to those same elements in the North Carolina Act. More-
over, the CAAA provides no discretion concerning how American companies
are to conduct their operations in South Africa.226 As a result, the federal gov-
ernment needs little protection in enacting its policy. If Congress were to amend
the CAAA to provide discretion, a preemption analysis might serve to strike
down the Divestment Act as might the need to protect the federal government's
ability to use its discretion to respond to changing situations. In conclusion,
applying the balancing test to the North Carolina Divestment Act results in
finding the Act constitutional.
The constitutionality of the various divestment acts has been a focus of
debate for several years. Thus far, there has been no conclusive answer to the
question of their constitutionality. The greatest strength of North Carolina's
Divestment Act is that it mirrors the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act which
Congress passed in 1986 and which incorporates the Sullivan Principles as a
mandatory Code of Conduct American companies must follow in their South
African operations. Because the North Carolina Divestment Act mirrors the
federal Act, it should survive a constitutional challenge based on preemption as
long as the state legislature amends the Act to exclude foreign incorporated
companies from its scope. This change will also assist the Act in withstanding a
foreign commerce clause challenge. The Act has the best chance of surviving
the interstate commerce clause challenge if it is found that the state is acting as a
market participant when it buys and sells securities for the funds it controls.
Adoption of a new balancing test that weighs a number of factors evaluating the
state's interest in deciding with whom to conduct its business against the federal
power over foreign affairs should permit the North Carolina Divestment Act to
withstand a foreign affairs challenge. The Divestment Act is an important
means by which the State of North Carolina can voice its opinion about the
224. See supra text accompanying note 211.
225. See supra text accompanying notes 199-202.
226. See supra text accompanying note 63.
[Vol. 67
1989] SOUTH AFRICAN DIVESTMENT STATUTE 975
policy of apartheid in the Republic of South Africa. The particular means the
general assembly selected to express this view is, for the most part, in keeping
with constitutional mandates so that with minimal amendments North Caro-
lina's voice may continue to be heard.
ANNE R. BOWDEN
